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Eric Sampson

Eric Sampson

Eric Sampson is a Junior Faculty Fellow with the Georgetown Institute for the Study of Markets and Ethics. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy in 2020 from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He specializes in ethics and epistemology and has interests in political philosophy, philosophy of religion, and philosophy, politics, and economics (PPE). 

He has written about whether the existence of widespread moral and political disagreement undermines our views about those topics, whether morality is invented or discovered, the nature of intellectual courage, and moral nihilism. This work has been published in, among other places, the Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, The Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, and Res Philosophica. 

He has taught a number of courses in applied ethics and political philosophy including The Ethics of War, Medical Ethics, PPE (philosophy, politics, and economics), and Political Philosophy. In fall 2020, Eric will teach Business Ethics and in spring 2021 he'll teach Technology and Ethics at Georgetown. 

                                                    Published Works


                                                        What if Ideal Advice Conflicts?: A Dilemma for Idealizing Reasons Subjectivism” Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)“How Level-Splitting Beliefs                                                     Can Help You Rationally Respond to Moral Disagreement" (with Margaret Greta Turnbull) in Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and                                                             Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge. (2020)

                                                    “The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14: 23-46. (2019)

                                                    “Against Scanlon’s Theory of the Strength of Practical Reasons” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3: 1-6. (2015)

                                                    “On Believing the Error Theory” (with Alexander Hyun) Journal of Philosophy 111: 631-640. (2014)

                                                    “Parsimony and the Argument from Queerness” (with Justin Morton) Res Philosophica 91: 609-627. (2014)