Many political theorists and philosophers use Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to defend democracy. This article illustrates an uncomfortable implication of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem. Realistically, when the conditions of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem hold, even in very high stakes elections, having more than 100,000 citizens vote does no significant good in securing good political outcomes. On the Condorcet model, unless voters enjoy voting, or unless they produce some other value by voting, then the cost to most voters of voting exceeds the expected epistemic benefits to the common good of their casting a vote. Anyone who is committed to democracy on the basis of the Jury Theorem ought also to hold that widespread voting is wasteful, at least unless he or she can provide some further justification of mass democratic participation.
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem and the Optimum Number of Voters
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem and the Optimum Number of Voters
Recent Publications
- “Equal Opportunity, Not Reparations” in the Handbook of Equality of Opportunity (2024)
- “A Bayesian Solution to Hallsson’s Puzzle”
- Markets without Limits: Moral Virtues and Commercial Interests, 2nd Edition
- “Optimizing political influence: a jury theorem with dynamic competence and dependence”
- Why not anarchism?
Recent News
- Advocacy group concerned pay-for-plasma clinics expanding to Ontario will hurt voluntary donations
- Jason Brennan and Hélène Landemore, Debating Democracy (University of Zurich’s UBS Center, 2024)
- Jason Brennan “Everything Wrong with Democracy” on the Alex O’Connor Podcast (January 28, 2024)
- On the affirmative action ruling, the Supreme Court got it half right
- Is the effective altruism movement in trouble?